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BOOK REVIEWS
TRIAL BY JURY. By Samuel W. McCart.t Pp. vii 204. Chilton Com-

pany, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1964. $4.95
This book is a welcome addition to the growing library on the merits
and demerits of the jury system in the administration of justice
under law. In a somewhat conversational style the author tends to
speak to three specific groups: the layman who is vitally interested
in the jury system as a part of the legal process; the practicing attorney who works with jurors and juries in a very real way; and the law
student who needs a better understanding and some general knowledge of the jury as an institution; information which he cannot obtain during his busy law school career.
The author is very frank in stating that his purpose is neither to
defend the jury trial system nor to condemn it, but rather to explain
the system in a manner easily understood by anyone. He has accomplished his purpose to a large extent, primarily because of the
conversational style of his manuscript and also because of the many
interesting facts he weaves into the manuscript, which facts ordinarily are not readily available. Throughout the book there are a
number of excellent brief historical backgrounds relative to the jury
system which even the experienced lawyer may not know and which
give life and meaning to the system.
It is apparent that much of the manuscript is the result of years of
experience in trying cases before a jury. Illustrative of the point is
the chapter, "The Selection of a Jury", in which the author discusses
the voir dire and indicates many of the evaluations that pass through
the lawyer's mind as he must forthwith decide whether to accept or
reject a particular juror.
The eighteen chapters in the book are nicely arranged. The first
two chapters outline the genesis of the jury system and how it became
a part of our judicial process. The search for jurors and the selection
of a jury, both criminal and civil, are discussed in the three subsequent chapters. The chapter, "Actors in the Drama", indicates the
proper spheres of counsel for both parties, the court, and the other
necessary court officials, and is well conceived. The author describes
tMember of the Bar, District of Columbia; LL.B., New York University.
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the opening of the trial, considers what constitutes evidence, speaks
of the defendant's case, and discusses the important and mysterious
power of directed verdicts. The chapter on the essential purpose of
the jury trial, namely, the ascertaining of truth, and the chapters on
the closing arguments of adverse counsel and the role of the judicial
office in charging the jury are presented with some revealing insights.
The author then discusses some of the things that go on inside the
jury room, the verdict that is rendered by the jury, the power of the
jury and, finally, the granting of a new trial and the functions of the
appellate courts.
This manuscript has a very special appeal to the general reader who
himself may sometimes be either a litigant, a witness, or a juror. The
chapter on the closing arguments by counsel should be quite revealing to the layman and is recommended reading for every juror before
beginning his jury duty, as it will give him a much better understanding of the function of a juror, particularly the use to be made of the
closing arguments of counsel. Other aspects of the book will give
the layman a better understanding of the jury system and how it operates in our system of jurisprudence, and may give him a greater
respect for the value of this system in our society.
Even the trial lawyer who has had much experience in the court
room will benefit from the book. In the chapter on the defendant's
case, the author points out nine courtroom tactics which should be
condemned but which "tricky" lawyers still use, not without some
immediate success, but with a jaundiced eye from the court and
opposing counsel. And in the chapter, "The Whole Truth", the
author reveals to even the practicing lawyer some practical ways in
testing the witness for telling the truth. Because this is most important to the success of the jury system, a trial lawyer must know
the tests and how to use them discreetly. The author refers to some
of the observable factors which may be detected when a witness
purposely departs from the truth. A law student may well take note
of these observable factors for, whether or not he ever tries a case in
a courtroom, he will be plagued throughout his professional career in
ascertaining the true facts even from his own clients. Clients are not
always known for their precise, objective presentation of a problem,
a fact which the lawyer learns from experience.
For the law student, not only is the historical prospective of the
jury system well outlined, but there are many practical suggestions
contained in the volume, illustrative of which is the change taking
place in our jurisprudence in the matter of the plea of insanity.
The chapter on "Directed Verdicts" is particularly revealing, not
only to the layman, but also to the practicing lawyer and the law
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student as well, because of the mystery which seems to be present
when the trial judge takes the case from a jury and directs a verdict.
This is a part of our law which causes difficulty for experienced lawyers and which is a mystery to laymen. Law students and practicing
lawyers sometimes regard it as a weapon to be feared. The author
presents an excellent analysis and evaluation of this judicial prerogative.
There are three appendices to the book, one of which is Natures of
Laws in General1 with several exclusions. Every lawyer should be
familiar with this treatise by Blackstone and have it readily available
in his office.
At this point, two observations should be made. The subtitle of the
book, "A Complete Guide to the Jury System", is highly presumptious
for the volume is clearly not a complete guide to the jury system.
Secondly, the chapter, "Inside the Jury Room", is theoretical and the
author missed the opportunity here to give the prospective juror some
practical guidelines as to his conduct and method of operation in the
jury room.
Although this volume could not be classified as a "must" for law
students and lawyers, it is worthy of a place in every lawyer's library;
it is the type of volume which merits reading after a difficult and
busy day in either the law school, the research library or the courtroom.
*Thomas F. Lansberry

Legal, Ethical and Moral Aspects. Edited by Irving Ladimert and Roger W. Newmant. Pp.
xxi, 517. Boston University Law-Medicine Research Institute,
Boston, Mass., 1964. $5.95.

CLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN MEDICINE:

In recent years there has been a considerable increase in medical research activities involving human subjects. As one might expect this
has been accompanied by a similar growth in the number of articles
dealing with the ethical, legal and moral environment for such ac1. BLACKSTONE (Harper Brothers. 21st London Edition, 1854.)
*President Judge, Sixteenth Judicial District, Somerset County,

Penn-

sylvania.
t Associate Research Professor of Legal Medicine, Law-Medicine Research
Institute, Boston University; S.J.D., J.D., George Washington University School
of Law; B.A., City College of N.Y.
t Research Attorney, Law-Medicine Research Institute, Boston University;
LL.B., Harvard Law School; B.A., Nebraska University.
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tivities. This anthology presents seventy-three selections from a
large body of literature on many aspects of clinical investigation and,
in addition, contains a bibliography of almost 500 other items that
have been written on the subject.
Interestingly enough, there has not been one reported judicial- decision specifically dealing with the standards to be applied in the true
experimental research situation. Perhaps the preceding statement is
subject to challenge because of the prosecutions of certain Nazi doctors whose conduct of experiments on human subjects led to their
conviction at the War Crimes trials. Nevertheless, the Nazi experiments were so different from the medical research being conducted
in the United States and other western countries at the present time,
that it was relatively simple to develop a standard against which to
measure the Nazi doctors. It is far more difficult to develop a standard, or forecast the standard the courts would apply in litigation
arising out of the conduct of clinical research carried out in our research institutions.
Basically, there are two matters to focus on in assessing the manner in which medical research with human subjects is conducted: the
consent of the subjects, and the research design and actual conduct of
the experiment. Practically all the articles in this anthology deal
with both of these, although some stress one considerably more than
the other.
The attorneys, along with the physicians and theologians, whose
contributions are part of this anthology, have had to wrestle with
the fact that there are no legal precedents in our common law experiience which go to the really difficult problems in human experimentation. The attorney reading this volume may conclude that the authors of a number of the selections are disappointed that there have
not been some decisions dealing with clinical research so that there
would be definitive legal guidelines. Several of the authors who are
not attorneys suggest that members of the legal profession should
set the standards that should be applied if litigation occurs. While
this striving for certainty is understandable, the difficulty in enunciating such a standard, and further, being assured that it would be
applied by a particular court, is very great.
The legal precedents cited by the authors to help evolve guidelines
are of two types: decisions dealing with malpractice where the court
has characterized some outrageous procedure by a physician or an
unlicensed quack as experimentation; and decisions dealing with consent to procedures which are clearly therapeutic or ostensibly theraputic and not part of a research design. These decisions are not very
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useful because they fail to deal with the true research environment,
which has its own complicating factors. It is somewhat misleading
for a court to characterize a procedure of dubious value on the part
of an unqualified practitioner as experimentation. The rule for considering this practitioner's conduct, deviation from the standard of
practice of physicians in the community, may not be useful in assessing a new technique, carefully set out in a research proposal approved
by authorities in the field and the administration of the institutions
where it is to be carried out. This is especially true where the existing conventional therapy for the condition has been rather unsuccessful, and a dramatic breakthrough is hoped for, both in the interest
of the subjects as well as in the interests of the community at large.
A number of the selections in this anthology describe attempts to
codify rules dealing with human experimentation, the most notable
of which is the Nuremberg Code. However, the formulations of these
rules leave much to be desired. The real stumbling block to almost
all analyses of human experimentation and its legal environment has
been the requirement of consent of the subjects to the particular experiment. In some experiments the subjects are persons who are
suffering from a particular condition and who receive a new and
different therapy, rather than the conventional one which is the
standard practice of physicians in dealing with the condition. In such
situations there is hope for therapeutic benefit to the subjects.
It would appear that such investigation involves few problems.
But, the use of the double blind test, where neither the subject nor
his physician knows whether the experimental agent or the traditional agent is being used because the research design prevents such
knowledge, inhibits obtaining a truly informed consent from the
subject. The double blind test, by denying the subject the knowledge
of what agent is to be received, raises doubt whether a truly informed
consent from the subject can be elicited. Yet, to a certain extent, by
informing the subject that he is a participant in the experiment and
giving him an indication of the risks and possible therapeutic value,
the consent requirement may be met, although there is not universal
agreement on this point.
In the case of the normal subject, one who is not suffering from any
particular malady or condition, but whose reactions to particular
agents is being measured, it is often difficult to give sufficient information so that a truly informed consent can be obtained. Where the
experiment involves measuring reactions to therapeutic agents,
stress, or any factor that may cause physiological or psychological
reactions, the results may be biased if the subjects are informed to
the extent that they can surmise what the reactions will be. Thus,
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the desire to have a scientifically reliable experiment may stand in the
way of obtaining informed consent.
When this point is reached in the discussion in a number of the
selections, the authors make a quick transition from the subject of
the experiment to its design, and justify the absence of informed
consent on the basis that the risks are minimal, or that the experiment could not be conducted successfully if the subject was fully
informed. These authors then lapse into cliches about the good
faith of the researcher and the fact that benefits derived from the
experiment, if of sufficient social value, justify withholding from the
subject the information necessary for his informed consent.
In commenting in this fashion, the reviewer does not mean to be
overly critical. Rather, the comments are intended to indicate the
complexity of the research context, and the formidable problems in
enunciating a code to cover all human experimentation. The field of
human experimentation is so broad and there are so many different
circumstances, that an all-inclusive code appears almost impossible
to formulate.
What conclusions can be drawn from the fact that there is no
body of useful precedents? Can much litigation concerning human
experimentation be anticipated in the near future? Perhaps the
meaning of the lack of litigation has not been sufficiently explored.
One might argue that safeguards are being imposed as needed
through administrative control upon physicians, scientists and institutions conducting research, and that the need to seek redress in the
courts for real or apparent harm has not materialized. As the devil's
advocate, one might propose another reason; that subjects who
have been harmed have no knowledge that they are being used in
experiments, and therefore do not possess sufficient information to be
aware that legal rights have been infringed upon in current experiments.
The most dramatic situation to come out of the field of human
experimentation in the last few years has involved implanting live
cancer cells in terminal patients in two New York nonprofit hospitals.
The public outcry was considerable, judging by the newspapers. The
most objectionable aspect of the procedure was that these patients
had no knowledge that they were being so used, and it may be assumed that at least some of these patients believed that they were receiving material which had potential therapeutic value. This was
clearly not the case. In defense of the investigators, on the basis of
previous research, there was no reason to believe that these patients
would suffer any harm. However, it was admitted that the patients
and their families were not informed, and that the members of the
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board of trustees of at least one of the institutions involved had no
knowledge that such experiments were being carried out on the
patients at the institution.
For the attorney, the question of whether hospital liability policies
and malpractice policies carried by the physicians protect against
actions arising out of the implantation of live cancer cells into uninformed patients must be considered. In the absence of consent such
an act constitutes a battery, which is both a crime and a civil wrong.
Since the procedure is not directed toward any therapeutic purpose,
conceivably the physician's malpractice and the hospital's liability
policies would not provide coverage.
Obviously, an attorney interested in the fascinating issues of
medical research with human subjects is not going to find definitive
answers to such questions in this volume. Nevertheless, the subject
of this anthology raises a very interesting question for members of
the legal profession. The growing concern about the legal aspects
of clinical investigation and use of human subjects in experiments
is obvious. Physicians and institutions are seeking legal advice concerning these activities. What does the attorney tell his client? Is the
attorney to take the extreme conservative position, and say to his
client that others should do the research, that other institutions and
physicians should advance the cause of medical knowledge, and that
his client should play it safe? Or, is the attorney going to devise a
code for his client to minimize risks of liability? Obviously, if investigators and research institutions consult their attorneys, and the
attorneys give extremely conservative advice, the researchers may be
in the position of choosing between curtailing their research activities greatly or acting contrary to their attorney's advice.
The lawyer called upon to give counsel on such matters should
realize that the client is seeking some kind of affirmative answer; an
answer that will permit him to proceed, subject to reasonable rules.
Since the client is coming to the attorney before, rather than after,
the conduct, the attorney must make a wholehearted effort to find a
basis on which to permit his client to proceed. If the research design
is considered sound by the researcher's peers and the attorney believes that the maximum effort, under the circumstances of the experiment, is being made to obtain informed consent from the research subjects, it would seem he has little basis upon which to withhold his approval in the absence of precedent.
Until such time as an action is brought which will force the court
to grapple with the difficult issues raised by modern medical research,
the lawyer must counsel his client without the aid of legal precedent
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This anthology, which contains some of the more important thinking
on the legal, ethical, moral and philosophical aspects of clinical investigation, should be helpful to the lawyer who must advise his client
in that vacuum.
By Nathan Hershey*

RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION.

By Paul G. Kauper.t Pp. 137. Lou-

isiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1964.

$3.50.
This book is based on the Edward Douglas White Lectures delivered
at Louisiana State University in the spring of 1964 by one of America's foremost authorities in the field of Constitutional Law. In this
book, Professor Kauper has expanded upon his earlier works on
church-state relations 1 and has documented this series of lectures
with the outstanding cases in this area. The book, itself, is divided
into four chapters. Chapter One is entitled "Some Introductory Considerations", and the author points to today's features of the interrelationship of the civil and the religious communities. Chapter Two
is labelled "Religious Liberty: Some Basic Considerations", and is
concerned with developing the theme that religious liberty is the
central facet in the constitutional order. Chapter Three is denominated "The First Amendment: Dilemma of Interpretation", and discusses the theories developed by the Supreme Court in interpreting
the establishment limitation of the First Amendment and its relationship to the free exercise guarantee. Chapter Four is listed as
"Government and Religion: Accomodation in a Pluralistic Society",
and is directed to the implications of constitutional doctrine in the
light of our contemporary religious pluralism, some specific problems
concerning religion in public life, and the use of governmental funds
to support church welfare and educational activities. In short, the
last chapter, with the author's analytical emphasis on the "permissible accommodation" theory, as fathered by Mr. Justice Douglas,
* Assistant Director, Health Law Center, Associate Research Professor of
Health Law, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh.
tProfessor of Law, University of Michigan; A. B., Earlham College; J. D.,
University of Michigan. Member of Indiana, New York and Michigan Bars.
1. Kauper, Church, State and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829
(1954). His essay, "The First Ten Amendments", won the Ross Essay Prize
given by the American Bar Association in 1951. His Civil Liberties and the
Constitution was awarded the National Mass Media Certificate of Recognition
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.
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represents the most significant contribution which the book makes to
the highly controversial church-state relationship problem.
In his introductory chapter, Professor Kauper points out that a
very substantial metamorphosis is taking place in the configuration
of American religious life; namely, that the Protestant domination
of the national religious life has come to an end; that there is an
emergence of contemporary religious pluralism with the concomitant
problems it raises of recognizing the demands of the major faiths,
minority groups, and all other varieties of belief; that there is an expansion of government activity in the fields of welfare and education
-- activities in which the churches once operated exclusively.
In summarizing the next chapter, the author proposes two theses:
(1) that the concept of religious liberty is the central concern of the
constitutional order; and (2) that the constitutional-provisions and
court decisions make it abundantly clear that religious liberty is a
broad, independent and a preferred constitutional concept.
According to the author, the most persuasive argument, that religion does not enjoy an independent status and that it should not be
accorded a preferred place under the First Amendment, has been advocated by Professor Kurland of the University of Chicago Law
School.2
The author suggests that, for the purpose of the First Amendment,
an attempt to define religion should be made by the courts and it
should include various elements deemed to be indispensable (p. 32).
However, the author recognizes there are permissible limitations
on religious liberty and he places them into two categories: (1) those
in which the religious belief becomes manifest in overt conduct which
conflicts with the state policy to reasonably promote the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare; and (2) those that directly
abridge or restrict the free expression of ideas in the interest of
public peace and security.
On the other hand, the author documents the preferred treatment
in the enjoyment of certain rights, privileges and immunities that
religious institutions receive. Recently, the reviewer wrote an article 3 in this related area and was groping for some examples which
the author furnishes and which would have been utilized.
In the next chapter, the author discusses the interpretation of the
establishment clause and its significance for governmental recogni2.

KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw, 16-18 (1962).

3. Rafalko, The Federal Aid to Private School Controversy: A Look, 3
Duquesne L. Rev. 211 (1965).
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tion and support of religion, with particular emphasis on the protection and promotion of religious liberty. The author points out that
the search for the original meaning and historical purpose underlying
this language has yielded inconclusive results and in the end the
Supreme Court is free to give the First Amendment language whatever meaning it chooses because it is futile to look to Jefferson and
Madison for answers to contemporary problems.
The author notes three reasons for the paucity of decisions by the
Supreme Court in interpreting the establishment of religion language:
(1) the difficulty for any person to acquire proper standing to raise
the First Amendment issue; (2) state constitutional provisions prohibiting the use of governmental funds for particular religious activities; and (3) the fact that the Supreme Court's application of the
First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment is a
recent development.
At this point, the author examines and gives a brief account of six
decisions in which the establishment of religion clause has played a
major part: the Everson,4 Mcollum,5 Zorach,6 Mc-owan,7 Engel s
and Schempp 9 cases. In three of these cases, namely those involving
bus transportation for public school children, Sunday closing, and released time off the school premises, the court found no violation of
the establishment of religion clause. In the other three cases, violations were found in the case involving released time on school premises and in the two cases dealing with prayer and Bible-reading exercises in public schools.
The opinions in these cases lead the author to the formulation of
three theories in his interpretation of the establishment of religion
clause:
1. The Strict Separation Theory. This theory found its first expression in the opinion by Mr. Justice Black in the Everson case. The
main concept that emerges from Everson is described as the principle
of "no-aid", namely, that government cannot by its programs, policies
or laws do anything to aid or support religion or religious activities.
2. The Neutrality Theory. This theory finds its expression in the
opinion by Mr. Justice Clark in the Schempp case. After reviewing all
4.
5.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

6.
7.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

8.
9.

Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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the cases in this area, he said what the Constitution requires is
"wholesome neutrality".
3. The Accommodation Theory. This theory, which the author
adopts, finds its expression in the Zorach case by Mr. Justice Douglas.
The principal thrust of this theory is that in some instances government may and, in others, must grant a preferred treatment to religious liberty.
The author states that it would be a mistake to suggest that the
theory of accommodation, which seems to be accepted by the majority
of the court, is unrelated to the other theories that have been developed. Rather, the accommodation theory, instead of being viewed
as a wholly independent theory, should be viewed as a modification of
the strict separation theory and the neutrality theory-a pragmatic
rather than a conceptualistic approach.
In the last chapter, the author applies his accommodation theory
to the church-related institutions in our pluralistic society. The discussion proceeds on the assumption that religion is relevant to life
and, therefore, to our secular, political and constitutional order.
The author examines the subject of religion in state-supported public schools and universities, as well as the social welfare and education benefits being furnished to church-related hospitals, and schools
at both the primary and secondary levels. He analyzes the reasons
why federal grants and subsidies might be given to all colleges and
universities, including church-related colleges and universities.
The climax of the book comes when the author ventures a personal
opinion as to the constitutional issue of appropriating federal funds
to parochial schools and the risks inherent in the acceptance of such
funds by church-related institutions. The author states:
The resolution of the constitutional issue as it arises under
the First Amendment is not foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's prior decisions, and it is hazardous to predict what
the court will do with this question if and when the issue is
properly presented. I am inclined to think, however, that
the use of federal funds to provide overall aid to parochial
schools-including support of operating costs (in particular
teacher's salaries), even as part of a program in support of
all schools--will be declared unconstitutional as a form of
aid to religion forbidden by the establishment clause (p.
112).
The Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of using public funds to provide bus transportation for
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children attending parochial schools and to provide free
secular textbooks to children attending all schools, including
parochial schools. Likewise, consistent with the denial of
support of the overall program which involves substantial
elements of religious instruction the possibility may be open
for limited assistance in financing special programs and in
acquiring physical facilities and equipment related to such
distinctively secular subjects as science, foreign languages,
mathematics, and physical education (p. 113).
This magnum opus is both timely and challenging. The book
stimulates a new and enlarged interest in an old problem shared by
lawyers, churchmen and the general public. It removes many of the
misconceptions, misunderstandings, and misstatements on the interrelationship that exists, or should exist, between church and government. Many will not agree with some of the things that the
author has written, but this is to be expected, for he is writing in a
highly emotional, controversial, and volatile area. However, it is
indeed fortunate that an authority of Professor Kauper's stature has
seen fit to write on this difficult subject. Professor Kauper's works
are always of the highest quality, but we are truly indebted to him
for his excellent research, organizational skill, clarity of style, and
mostly for his legal analysis, in this particuar book. This book by
design is concise-brief but complete.
Walter A. Rafalko*
*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

